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This report forms part of a wider study on “Policy Research – Implications of 
Liberalisation of Fish Trade for Developing Countries”, comprising five trade issues 
background papers and five country case studies. 
 
The trade issues background papers are dealing with the following topics: 
· Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) Measures and Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT) 
· Ethical/Social/Eco Certification, Labelling and Guidelines 
· The Impact of Subsidies on Trade in Fisheries Products 
· The Impact of Dumping on Trade in Fisheries Products 
· Fiscal Reforms and Trade in Fisheries Products 
 
The case studies cover the following countries: 
· Bangladesh 
· Guinea 
· India 
· Uganda 
· Vietnam 
 
For a synthesis of the entire study including policy recommendations, see: 
Bostock, T., Greenhalgh, P. and Kleih, U. (2004), Policy Research – Implications of 
Liberalisation of Fish Trade for Developing Countries – Synthesis Report.  Chatham, 
UK: Natural Resources Institute.  ISBN 0 85954 560-1. 
 
Copies of the various reports are available on the following websites: 
· www.onefish.org/id/225570 
· www.nri.org/projects/projects/htm 
 
The study was funded by the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (BMZ), and the UK’s Department for International Development 
(DFID). 
 
The views expressed in this report are solely those of the author and do not 
necessarily represent the views of BMZ, DFID, FAO or GTZ. 
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4. THE IMPACT OF SUBSIDIES ON TRADE IN FISHERIES 1 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
World attention was drawn to the scale of the global fisheries crisis and also the 
extent of fishery subsidies in 1992 with the publication of an FAO report, Marine 
Fisheries and the Law of the Sea: A Decade of Change.  This report highlighted two 
main causes of the crisis: first many fisheries were not managed and were open access 
fisheries, and second ‘the annual operating costs greater than total revenues, with no 
account being taken of capital costs’ (as cited by Schrank 2003), i.e. marine fisheries 
were heavily subsidized, eliminating the market signals of over-fishing. Subsequently 
a number of reports have attempted to clarify what constitutes a subsidy and to 
estimate their magnitude.  This debate has focused largely on developed country 
fisheries and fishing fleets and there is limited information on developing countries or 
at the micro level.  Debates at the policy level have included submissions to the World 
Trade Organisation to investigate the trade status of fisheries subsidies and in the 
words of the US delegation to the WTO to take steps ‘toward the development of 
clarified and improved disciplines’ (WTO 2003).  There are also on-going discussions 
in the FAO. 
 
In the literature there is considerable debate as to what fishery subsidies actually are 
and what they include which complicates any discussion of their implications for 
markets, resources and livelihoods.  A useful definition is provided by Westlund 
(2003) who defines fisheries subsidies as “government actions or inactions that are 
specific to the fisheries industry and that modify – by increasing or decreasing – the 
potential profits by the industry in the short-, medium- or long-term”.  However, 
whatever the total level of subsidy that is directed at the fisheries sector, Schrank 
(2003) argues that the question of ultimate importance is the effect of government 
policy on the behaviour of the fishing company.  Thus his definition of what 
constitutes a subsidy is more restrictive than other definitions that relate government 
policy to the profits of a particular fishing company as he argues that it is the reaction 
of the firm to the change in profits that is significant.   
 
There is a dearth of information, particularly in any detail, of subsidies in developing 
countries, or indeed the implications of subsidies worldwide, for developing 
countries.  Most discussion is based on subsidies in developed or middle-income 
countries, indeed members of the OECD account for at least 51% of all subsidies in 
the fishing sector (OECD 2003).  However, the importance of fishery subsidies is 
underlined by their inclusion in the post-Doha WTO negotiating agenda. 
 
Subsidies have long been part and parcel of the fishing industry, partly because of the 
public good nature of fisheries management and associated research, but also because 
of the precarious livelihood experienced by most fishing communities.  Schrank 
(2003) provides short histories of fisheries subsidies in the USA, Canada, Norway, 
Iceland and selected South American countries (Peru, Chile, Brazil, Argentina, 
Uruguay)  and dating back over two hundred years in some cases.  These histories 
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highlight how subsidies were economically and socially justified when instigated and 
also the problems of institutionalisation and dependency when the original rationale 
has disappeared or benefits eroded. 
 
Most of the literature on subsidies in fisheries focuses on marine capture fisheries 
rather than aquaculture.  Within marine capture fisheries, it appears that the bulk of 
subsidies are aimed at offshore fisheries which are largely commercial requiring 
mechanised ocean-going vessels rather than coastal or inshore fisheries that are 
largely artisanal in nature.  OECD and middle-income countries are responsible for 
the majority of subsidies, but some of these subsidies have implications for 
developing country fisheries and livelihoods of poor people.  Most significant in this 
respect are bilateral fishing agreements, also known as bilateral access agreements 
(see Box 1).  
 
The definition of fisheries subsidies is a tricky area for technical and also political 
reasons.  With the increasingly prominent role of the WTO and pressures for 
liberalisation few governments want to admit to the extent of their subsidies that they 
may wish to protect for local political reasons.  Transparency regarding subsidies is an 
issue: few members of the WTO have complied with their obligation to report 
subsidies, and the gaps in data collection by major studies by OECD and APEC reveal 
the extent of the problem (WWF 2001).  The political sensitivity of the subsidies issue 
is highlighted by the use of euphemisms for subsidy: OCED refers to ‘government 
financial transfers’ and the FAO to ‘economic incentives’ (Schrank 2003).  Subsidies 
may also be considered a type of incentive, and so data on subsidies may be 
intermingled with data on this wider policy instrument. 
 
There are also large inconsistencies in the data publicly available: WWF compares the 
data presented by the OECD and APEC studies in comparison to reports to the WTO.  
Only the EU displays any consistency between the two sources (WWF 2001).  The 
consultants for the OECD study gave governments the freedom to complete 
questionnaires themselves, leading to the potential for similar items to be categorised 
differently (Schrank 2003).  Co-operation from government bodies can also be a 
challenge; for example, an FAO commissioned survey in 1997 faced a problem of 
very low response rates from member governments (Steenblik and Munro 1999). 
 
There has been more attention in the literature to the trade effects of subsidies rather 
than their effects on sustainability, partly at least because the WTO has powers to 
police trade effects whereas the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
and the FAO has fewer sanctions.  However, the recent FAO expert consultations 
have begun to consider sustainability and livelihood impacts and following from this 
the FAO has recently commissioned a case study of Senegalese fisheries that will 
focus on these issues.  Another exception is the detailed study undertaken for DFID 
by the Marine Resources Assessment Group (MRAG), Cambridge Resource 
Economics and International Institute for Environment and Development produced in 
2000, (henceforth referred to as MRAG) that considers the implications for 
developing countries of subsidies, particularly developed country subsidies for deep 
water fleets (DWFs) in the context of bilateral fishing agreements (Box 1). 
 
This paper begins by describing various definitions of subsidies used in recent studies, 
highlighting what they cover and significant differences between them.  It then 
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discusses work to date on assessing the impact of subsidies, focusing particularly on 
the implications for developing countries.  This section draws considerably on the 
MRAG study.  The next section discusses attempts to bring fisheries subsidies onto 
the agenda of the WTO and the related policy debate.  The final section draws some 
conclusions and raises issues for the current study. 
 
4.2 Defining and estimating the extent of subsidies  
 
There have been three major studies that have collected data from governments to 
estimate the extent of fisheries subsidies and there is also data available in member 
reports to the WTO.  These studies are: 
· Milazzo (1998); 
· OECD; the study commenced in 1997 and reported in 1999 and is summarised 
in OECD (2003); and  
· APEC (2000). 
In addition, the WWF (2001) has collated the data from the OECD and APEC studies 
and compared it with figures from the WTO (specifically from notifications under the 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures agreement) and other public sources to derive 
what they see as more accurate and complete figures.  The WWF study argues that the 
expenditure on subsidies has been consistently underreported both to the WTO and 
consultants hired by OECD and APEC.  The actual extent of global subsidies they 
estimate to be in the region of $15 billion rather than the $12 billion implied by 
extrapolating the APEC study to cover all fisheries.   
 
The main categories used in the Milazzo, OECD, APEC and WWF studies are 
summarised in Table 4.1, together with those of the WTO.  Table 4.2 presents the 
studies’ estimates of the magnitude of subsidies and subsidies reported to the WTO. 
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Table 4. 1: Contents of Key Studies on Fisheries Subsidies 
Source WTO Milazzo (1998) APEC (2000) OECD (2003) WWF (2001) 
Term for 
subsidy 
Financial contributions Subsidies Subsidies Government Financial 
Transfers 
Subsidies 
Coverage 1. Transfer of funds (e.g. 
grants, loans, equity 
infusions) 
2. Potential transfers of funds 
(e.g. loan guarantees) 
3. Foregone government 
revenue (e.g. tax 
preferences) 
4. Goods or services (e.g. 
other than general 
infrastructure) 
5. Payments to a funding 
mechanism or to a private 
body to perform any of the 
above 
6. Price or income support 
programmes 
Builds on WTO framework 
with addition of harvesting 
sector rather than entire 
fishing industry; 
With addition of  
· Cross-sectoral subsidies 
such as: (a) those to the 
shipbuilding industry 
that may impinge on 
fisheries; and (b) 
infrastructure spending 
that may or may not be 
targeted to fisheries 
infrastructure but which 
is paid for by 
government and which 
affects fisheries;  
· Resource rent subsidies; 
and  
· Conservation subsidies 
e.g. vessel and fishing 
permit buybacks, stock 
enhancement, retraining 
of fishermen and 
research and 
development of 
environmentally 
improved gear.   
1.Direct assistance to 
fishermen and fish 
workers;  
2.Lending support 
programmes;  
3.Tax preferences and 
insurance support 
programmes;  
4.Capital and infrastructure 
support programmes;  
5.Marketing and price 
support programmes; and  
6.Fisheries management and 
conservation programmes 
 
 
Explicitly includes support 
programmes that would not 
ordinarily be considered 
subsidies 
 
Government interventions 
that alter the incentive 
structure 
 
1. Cost-reducing transfers 
and direct payments 
2. General services 
including: 
· Management 
· Enforcement 
· Surveillance 
· Port infrastructure 
· Regional development 
grants 
· Expenditure to promote 
international fisheries 
co-operation. 
 
Discusses but does not 
include in measurement 
market price support  
 
Does not usually include cost 
of public fisheries 
management as a subsidy, 
but as OECD and APEC 
combine this in general 
categories, frequently these 
costs are included in the 
WWF estimate. 
 
Uses the APEC classification 
but moving worker 
adjustment programmes and 
fisher retraining from 
category 1 to category 6. 
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Table 4.2: Estimates of Magnitude of Fisheries Subsidies 
Source WTO Milazzo (1998) APEC (2000) OECD (2003) WWF (2001) 
Estimate 
of 
subsidy 
values 
WTO annual 
notifications as 
reported by 
WWF 2001 
1996 – $5.85 
bn 
1997 – $0.82 
bn 
Annual average 
1990s - $14 
billion to $20.5 
billion 
1997 - $12.6 
billion 
 
1996-- $6.95 
billion 
1997 - $6.38 
billion 
1998 - $5.481 
billion 
1999 - $5.97 
billion 
Late 1990s, 
estimate 
correcting for 
under-reporting 
£15 billion 
Countries 
included 
All members Global Pacific Rim 
countries 
OECD member 
countries 
Global 
Coverage ? 100% Approx 70% of 
production 
Approx 51% of 
global subsidies 
100% 
Note: No studies comprehensively survey developing countries. 
 
The WTO’s definition of subsidies in the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(SCM) has been used as a basis for analysing subsidies in the fisheries sector, e.g. by 
Milazzo (1998), see below.  As fisheries were excluded from the 1994 Agreement on 
Agriculture, the sector is subject to the general disciplines specified by the WTO 
SCM.  However, the WTO definition of subsidies within the agreement is somewhat 
narrower than those used by most studies as it is chiefly concerned with the trade 
effects of subsidies in general, rather than effects on conservation or fisheries 
management.  The SCM defines subsidies as, inter alia: 
· Specific financial transfers from state to the industry (including implied transfers 
such as loan guarantees) e.g. EU FEOGA/FIFG grants for vessel or fish farm 
construction. 
· Conversely, the state foregoing normally collectable revenue (e.g. tax free fuel) 
Provision of services or investments to industry that would not “normally” be state 
provided. E.g. indirect subsidies such as state cold storage facilities or specifically 
targeted research programmes.2 
· State purchases of industry outputs other than on commercial terms e.g. state 
purchase of farmed salmon gluts as countenanced by the Norwegian government 
in 1990. 
· All forms of state income or price support (e.g. production subsidies designed to 
maintain prices, reference prices etc.). 
 
In addition subsidies are categorised in relation to the rights of members to make 
complaint and take action (countervailing measures) with respect to alleged trade-
distorting subsidies undertaken by other members. 3  In this respect there are two 
categories of subsidy:4 
                                                 
2 Some commentators, such as WWF (2001), argue that research and some fisheries management 
services should not be considered subsidies, or at least not ‘bad’ subsidies, as they are necessary due to 
the public good nature of the fisheries resource. 
3 The extent to which subsidies may risk challenge in the WTO under the SCM is discussed in detail in 
APEC (2000). 
4 Until January 2000, there was a third category of subsidy: non-actionable.  This was a subsidy that 
could not be challenged unless they were prohibited subsidies and includes pre-competitive assistance 
for research activities (i.e., support provided prior to development of products for market use); 
assistance to disadvantaged regions as part of a regional development assistance program; or assistance 
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· Prohibited: including export enhancing subsidies or subsidies giving preference to 
domestic producers or grants tied to the use of domestically produced goods. 
· Actionable: a subsidy that may be challenged on the basis of causing ‘adverse 
effects’ to the interests of other WTO members and if the subsidy is specific to an 
enterprise or group of enterprises or industries (generally available subsidies are 
permitted). 
 
In practice many subsidies in the fishing sector in both developed and developing 
countries are either prohibited or actionable subsidies (Grynberg 2003). 
 
There is general agreement that the WTO definition of subsidies in the context of the 
SCM is not broad enough for an assessment of fisheries subsidies as it does not take 
into account issues related to public goods and the management of open access 
resources.  Nevertheless, the WTO’s definition has been the foundation for a number 
of studies. Milazzo (1998) adapted and added to the WTO categories of subsidies in a 
groundbreaking attempt to quantify the level of worldwide subsidies, focusing on 
subsidies with direct fiscal implications to governments.  He treats separately 
subsidies that reduce exploitation effort; divert producers from activities that promote 
over-exploitation to more benign economic endeavours; are intended to enhance the 
resource base and/or hasten the development of more environmentally benign 
harvesting technology. 
 
In his estimate, Milazzo distinguishes between budgeted and unbudgeted subsidies.  
Unbudgeted subsidies he suspects are likely to be more significant in developing 
countries.  One of the main difficulties experienced in this study was that he relied on 
publicly available data that was rarely disaggregated to the level required to 
distinguish between different kinds of expenditure, a problem that is acute with 
unbudgeted subsidies including subsidised lending and tax preferences.  Many of his 
estimates for specific items and countries are therefore quite rough.  Another 
challenge is the estimation of resource rents, which is really a hypothetical category 
related to the tendency to under-price natural resources.  He refers to the unrecovered 
costs of fisheries management, the cost of collateral environmental damage and the 
value of the fish removed from the sea.  Whilst the legitimacy of user fees is not 
questioned with respect to other natural resources such as forest, oil and gas reserves, 
Milazzo notes that user fees for use of marine resources are less frequently charged; 
for example, fees to private companies benefiting from bilateral fishing agreements.  
No other study attempts estimation of resource rents. 
 
Nevertheless, however, Schrank (2003) considers that Milazzo’s estimate for the 
global level of subsidies in the range of $14 billion to $20.5 billion to be ‘reasonable’.  
This study does not go on to consider the implications of these subsidies for the 
behaviour of fishing firms. 
                                                                                                                                            
to promote adaptation of existing facilities (facilities in operation for at least two years) to new 
environmental requirements. 
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The APEC study conducted by Price Waterhouse Coopers (APEC 2000) uses a 
relatively broad definition of subsidies (including fisheries management costs, not 
usually considered a subsidy, but not including general subsidies that may apply to 
fisheries) and provides a very detailed breakdown of categories in its attempt to 
quantify subsidies.  It organises the data on subsidies into six categories (see Table 
4.1).  The study relates to members of the Asia Pacific Co-operation and includes data 
on Canada, Chile, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Mexico, 
New Zealand, People’s Republic of China, Peru, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and 
United States.  Covering both developed and less developed countries, this study 
covers in the region of 70% of fisheries production and so is likely to deal with the 
vast majority of the subsidies that are applied in the sector, with the exception of the 
European Union. 
 
WWF use an adapted version of the APEC classification due to its level of detail and 
therefore usefulness for allocating and then adding up the data on different kinds of 
subsidies from various sources.   
 
Reference should also be made to a fifth study on fisheries subsidies by Westlund 
(2003) that provides a useful categorisation, but does not attempt an estimate of 
subsidy values, rather provides a detailed guide on how subsidies may be estimated, 
both in terms of the cost to government and the value to the industry.  Cost to 
government and value to the industry are likely to be very dif ferent sums involving 
different processes of estimation, some more straight forward and accurate than 
others.  No other study makes this distinction which is important in furthering the 
debate on the impacts of subsidies.  This FAO commissioned study is pa rt of an on-
going debate in the FAO on subsidies and is expected to be used in the recently 
commissioned field study of the impact of subsidies in Senegal.  Westlund (2003) 
suggests that there are four basic categories of subsidy: 
1. Direct financial transfers, e.g. investment grants to purchase vessels; 
2. Services and indirect financial transfers, e.g. import quotas, fuel tax 
exemptions; 
3. Interventions with different short and long term effects, e.g. environmental 
protection programmes, gear regulations; 
4. Lack of intervention, e.g. free access to fishing grounds. 
The methodology in the Guide focuses largely on costs and values in the short-term, 
and in terms of impact, the short-term effects of subsidies on profits.  It is 
acknowledged that in the long-term subsidies will ‘affect the actual structure of the 
industry’ and so it is important to track long-term impacts, but that this is very 
difficult to do (Westlund 2003: 58).  However, estimation of short-term impacts on 
profits is seen as an important interim step.  We return to the issue of impact in 
Section 4. 
 
From the tables, it can be seen that there are some disparities between the studies as 
regards both what is considered a subsidy and also the value attributed to subsidies.  
Areas of dispute regarding the categories of subsidy to include resource rents and 
market and price supports.  As regards the estimates, compared to the Milazzo and 
WWF studies, the OECD estimate appears rather small.  It should also be noted that 
the WTO notifications are particularly low and vary considerably from year to year; 
very few members fulfil their obligations regarding notification and the figure can be 
affected by single notifications in some instances. 
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Box 1 :Bilateral fishing agreements 
 
Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea the exclusive fishing 
zones of coastal nations (also known as exclusive economic zones, EEZ) was 
extended in 1976 to 200 miles as opposed to the customary 12 miles.  This meant that 
many DWF were excluded from fishing in what had been their traditional waters.  
Agreements were therefore reached between the home governments of the deep-sea 
fleets and the coastal nations so that these fleets could continue to fish, but the owners 
of the fisheries could be compensated.  Such bilateral fishing agreements were 
particularly arranged between large fishing nations and developing countries that did 
not have the capacity to exploit deep-water fisheries.  Typical examples include 
between Japan and South Pacific states, Korea and other South East Asian nations and 
the European Union and African coastal states.  Partly as a result of these agreements, 
there has been a considerable increase over the last few decades in the volumes of fish 
being landed in developing countries.  In the late 1990s over half of the yield 
harvested off the shore of West Africa was accounted for by the deep water fleets, 
usually registered in Europe (Payne 2000 citing Brandt 1999). 
 
Bilateral fishing agreements are made between states, but constitute subsidies, argues 
MRAG (2000) where the cost of the agreement is not passed on to the industry.  
These subsidies tend to be justified by the fact that the home government was party to 
UNCLOS and therefore the restrictions on foreign fishing in EEZ.5  However, MRAG 
(2000) points out that they are inconsistent with WTO disciplines. 
 
EU fishing access agreement with ACP countries 
 
The EU has arranged access for EU deep water fleets in the fisheries of several 
African and other developing country nations (see annex 1).  Bilateral fishing 
agreements account for one third of the EU fisheries budget, which was $400 million 
in the late 1990s (MRAG 2000).  These are part of the trade and development 
agreements between the African, Caribbean and Pacific nations (ACP) and the EU as 
set out initially in the series of Lomé Agreements and later the Cotonou agreement.  
Through these agreements, fishing firms within the EU gain access to the ACP waters 
in return for the EU allowing preferential access of the foreign partner’s fish products 
to EU markets. 
 
There is some debate regarding the extent to which the fact that government rather 
than fishing companies pay for the fishing rights constitutes a subsidy, and regarding 
the extent of the subsidy.  Issues to consider with respect to the EU-ACP fisheries 
access and trade agreements according to Schrank (2003) include: 
1. The level of the payment in kind to the individual fishing firm on account of it 
not having to pay for the access; this can be simplified if there are comparable 
firms from a different country that do have to pay a user fee. 
2. The extent to which the trade agreement providing preferential access for the 
ACP country negates the positive subsidy aspects of access to the fishing 
grounds. 
In practice, due to the low level of development of some ACP fishing fleets, the level 
                                                 
5 Schrank (2003) however notes that there have been moves to the introduce user fees for the fishing 
fleets 
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of competition offered by preferential access is likely to be low.  However, MRAG 
(2000) offers some examples of conflict between EU DWF and fishing fleets of the 
coastal nations (e.g. conflict between Mozambican vessels in inshore areas, some 
damage to Senegalese vessels by DWF vessels). 
 
There are a number of policy issues related to bilateral fishing agreements, including 
the level of fee paid for access to these coastal waters, the extent to which the fishery 
is properly managed and monitored and the often complicated linkage between the 
agreements and aid packages.  The EU’s access to developing country fisheries is 
associated with the Lomé and subsequently Cotonou agreements with the ACP states.  
Moreover responsibility for the agreements is split between two EU bodies- DG Fish 
and DG Development - with competing mandates (Payne 2000).  Part of the 
compensation payment from the EU to coastal ACP states for access rights is 
supposed to pay for management of the fishery including monitoring and assessment 
of the resource.  This in effect absolves the EU from such responsibilities.  However, 
the capacity of the coastal state to undertake such management, especially when it has 
no deep-water vessels of its own, has not been taken into account in the Lomé 
agreement.  However, due to the changed global marine policy climate following the 
development of the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, the Cotonou 
agreement and the Common Fisheries Policy will be under pressures to consider 
proper fisheries management and conservation of stocks, especially in developing 
country coastal waters.   
 
The reform of the Common Fisheries Policy in the EU has announced that ‘fisheries 
partnership agreements’ with a sustainability agenda will replace fisheries access 
agreements, suggests a positive change, but these agreements have the potentially 
conflicting objective of protecting EU fishing interests. 
 
Another trend that may affect bilateral fishing agreements is the increasing use of 
joint ventures between fishing companies from developed countries with developing 
coastal nations (MRAG 2000). 
 
 
 
4.3 Subsidies used in developing countries 
 
The discussion above largely focuses on subsidies that are directed at the fisheries 
sectors in developed or middle-income countries.  This is largely due to the ease of 
access to data but also because the vast majority of subsidies in the sector are in 
middle-income and particularly developed countries.  Moreover, MRAG (2000) 
argues that subsidies on DWF from developed countries ‘are likely to have a much 
greater impact’ on developing countries as compared to subsidies given by their own 
governments.  Similarly, it has been noted that the type of subsidy most frequently 
found in developing countries is in form of bilateral or multilateral development 
projects.   
 
There are however, some subsidies in developing countries in the fishing sector.  
Some examples are given below: 
· In developing countries port facilities are more likely to be owned and managed 
by the public sector.  If the facilities have no other commercial or community use 
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beyond fishing, then this can be considered a direct subsidy to the industry 
(MRAG 2000). 
· Subsidised lending (Milazzo 1998) and credit provision, e.g. in the Philippines, 
Papua New Guinea, and Mexico.  In some cases these were meant for the poor and 
less-privileged to adopt new technology e.g. new craft-gear combinations. In Sri 
Lanka for example, the drive for craft mechanisation in the late 1950’s was 
implemented using a high rate of subsidization of crafts (up to 50%) and the 
ordinary fishermen benefited significantly from this move. But in other cases, 
poorer fishers have faced barriers in taking up credit due to either a) the high 
initial costs of new technology, and/or b) the inability to provide appropriate 
collateral (Personal comm. G Macfadyn). 
· Sales tax exemptions for inputs used by the fishing industry provide general 
support for the industry. They appear to be popular among the island nations of 
the Caribbean (Schrank 2003). 
· Subsided fishing inputs in the form of import-tax exemptions occur in Albania, 
Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Gulf States, Tanzania, and West Indies).  In some cases the 
subsidy is tied to the use of sustainable fishing equipment (e.g. Oman) (Pers com 
G Macfadyn). 
· The case study on India outlines a comprehensive range of subsidies affecting the 
fishing sector e.g. subsidies on fuel, electricity, engines, lending and institutional 
support.  
 
The MRAG study cautions that in the case of developing countries the policy basis for 
fishery subsidies should be carefully scrutinised, especially in the international policy 
climate in which there are loud calls to ban all subsidies in the sector.  It is noted that 
it is not always a subsidy that is the cause of negative impact on stocks or trade, rather 
it is the ‘failure of most fisheries management regimes to effectively regulate 
capacity’ (MRAG 2000: 18).  The removal of subsidies is likely to leave continued 
negative impacts in many cases. 
 
 
4.4 Studies on the impacts of fisheries subsidies 
 
In the literature by and large the impact of fisheries subsidies is discussed in the 
abstract with the use of theoretical models.  Quantitative modelling is acknowledged 
to be extremely difficult in the absence of detailed and accurate data on the extent of 
subsidies and also due to the multiple causes of changes in fisheries stocks.  There 
have been some recent efforts to consider impacts using case studies and qualitative 
modelling, the most significant being a study commissioned by DFID and undertaken 
by MRAG in collaboration with CRE and IIED in 2000, which focused specifically 
on the implications of subsidies on deep water vessels that benefited from bilateral 
fishing agreements.  This is discussed in detail below. 
 
There has also been a discussion in the FAO on the impacts of fisheries subsidies.  In 
November 2000, FAO sponsored an Expert Consultation on Economic Incentives and 
Responsible Fisheries that began a discussion on the impacts of fisheries subsidies.  It 
highlighted the difficulties involved in measuring the impact of subsidies on fish 
stocks and emphasised that subsidies were only half of the story, rather it was 
necessary to consider the link between subsidy and behaviour in the context of 
fisheries management practices.  This consultation highlighted that not all subsidies 
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necessarily have negative influence on fish stocks if there are effective management 
systems in place.  The expert consultation also discusses methodological challenges 
and recommended further research in the area of impact assessment.  This led to the 
study by Westlund (2003) discussed above which provides a detailed methodology for 
quantifying subsidies in terms of the cost to government, and more significantly the 
value to the industry.  Following on from this, the FAO has commissioned a detailed 
case study of fisheries subsidies in Senegal. 
 
With respect to abstract models, OECD (2003) presents a simple qualitative economic 
model based on the work of Hanesson. This considers the effects of giving 
government financial transfers to fisheries and suggests that in the main where there is 
catch control or preferably effective fisheries management, GFT have no effect on the 
total catch or the price of fish.  Under effective fisheries management there should be 
no long-term effect on trade or on the rest of the economy, but the profitability of the 
industry should rise.  Under open access the total catch increases initially, but then 
falls in the long run if the stock is exploited beyond maximum sustainable yield.  
However prices should rise, if the catch falls, alongside the profitability of the 
industry, especially for companies that are well-managed.  The important caveat 
regarding impacts is therefore to have a well-managed fishery.  This is not the case on 
the high seas outside of the exclusive economic zones and in many coastal waters of 
developing countries.  Thus the main concern regarding the effect of GFTs is in the 
context of open access fisheries.   
 
However, the diagrams presented by Flaaten and Wallis (2000) that model the effect 
of revenue enhancing transfers on effort and total revenue and yield and stock levels 
in different situations -over-fished and under-fished cases- raises concerns even in the 
context of well-managed fisheries.  They argue effort will increase as a result of 
transfers even when there are restrictions on vessels as in the long run ‘in a dynamic 
business environment technical improvements are likely to expand real capacity and 
effort’. 
 
Schrank (2003) argues that there is considerable potential for economic and bio-
resource modelling, at the same time there is a need for more detailed empirical work 
on actual subsidies and the contexts in which they are applied. 
 
The interaction between context and subsidy is a key theme of the MRAG study on 
the impacts of subsidies in developing countries (2000). Case study developing 
country coastal/island states are examined in this study in relation to the bilateral 
access agreements that subsidise the DWF of European Union countries operating in 
the EEZ of each of the cases.  The main DWF nations (EU and non-EU) that have 
such subsidised access and the main species that are fished in these areas are shown in 
Table 4.3.  It is argued that bilateral access agreements (See Box 1) are the kind of 
subsidy that have most impact on developing country coastal and island states.  The 
study goes on to provide a useful typology of coastal developing countries with 
respect to their vulnerability to impacts, both negative and positive, from subsidies.  
The categories of developing country are shown in Table 4.4.   
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Table 4.3: DWF Countries operating in Case Study countries 
Case Study Country Main DWF nations Main species 
Cape Verde France, Portugal, Spain Tuna, shrimp 
Mauritania France, Portugal, Spain, 
Japan, Russia, Ukraine, 
Estonia, Latvia 
Cephalopods, hake, tuna, 
small pelagics 
Mozambique Spain, Japan Shrimp, tuna 
Namibia Spain, Japan, Namibia Hake, small pelagics 
Senegal France, Spain Cephalopods, tuna, small 
pelagics 
Seychelles  Tuna 
Source: MRAG 2000 
 
Table 4.4: Typology of coastal developing countries  
Vulnerability type Case study example 
Poor, resource-dependent 
coastal states without local 
fishing industry 
Mauritania 
Poor, resource-dependent 
coastal states with local 
fishing industry 
Mauritania (pelagics, demersals, including 
cephalopods) 
Senegal (tuna and demersals, including cephalopods) 
Mozambique (shrimp) 
Seychelles (tuna) 
Wealthier, resource-
dependent coastal states 
with local fishing industry  
Cape Verde 
Namibia 
Seychelles 
Wealthier, economically 
diversified coastal states 
Namibia 
Small island states 
 
Seychelles 
Source: Derived from MRAG 2000 
 
The study identifies six stages (and a variety of critical factors for each stage) in the 
subsidy-to-impact process.  These are: 
1. Types of subsidy (direct financial assistance, indirect financial assistance, 
resource rent subsidies, price supports, trade restrictions, targeted assistance 
for DWF); 
2. Types of effects of subsidies (on costs of fishing, fishing effort, incentives to 
access a fishery, effects on home and foreign trade); 
3. Types of access mechanisms and subsidy conditions; 
4. Types of fishing fleets and fisheries; 
5. Types of resource impacts (on target species, by-catch and indirectly affected 
species  -fish numbers, fish sizes, overall stock); 
6. Types of economic and social impacts (economic value of natural resource 
loss, national accounts and income flows, trade implications, investment, 
government revenue, livelihood opportunities, incidence of poverty, 
community disintegration/ migration, skills base, nutritional impacts). 
It is acknowledged that it is very difficult to link subsidies directly to impacts because 
of the wide range of subsidies that may be applied and of mechanisms by which their 
effects are transmitted.  Moreover, as we note above, the subsidy itself may not be the 
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cause of potential negative impacts, this may well be poor management regimes or the 
lack of management regimes. 
 
Key steps in analysis, according to MRAG (2000) include: 
· Identifying the specific effects of different kinds of subsidy; 
· Identification the extra effort employed by fleets; 
· Mapping implications for the resource; 
· Translation of the resource effects into social and economic impacts. 
 
The MRAG project report provides considerable detail on each of the studies and 
summary tables indicating both negative and positive impacts from the access 
agreements organised under three headings: biomass and stocks; economic and social.  
Negative impacts are summarised in Table 4.5 and positive impacts in Table 4.6.  It 
should be noted that in the case of Mozambique very limited negative impacts were 
listed and in the case of Mauritania there were no positive impacts reported. 
 
Table 4.5: Negative impacts 
Biomass and Stocks Economic Social 
Excessive catches 
Reduction of inshore 
stocks or specific species 
Interruption of artisanal 
fishing 
Reduction in certain 
species due to by-catch 
Dumping on local markets 
Insufficient local landings 
for efficient operation of 
local processing 
Domination of the local 
market by foreign fishers 
Loss of value added in the 
country 
Damage to local vessels 
Reduction in employment 
in processing  
Reduction in local fishing 
incomes 
Decrease in availability of 
fresh fish on local market 
Limited opportunities for 
employment on foreign 
vessels 
Source: Derived from MRAG 2000 
 
Table 4.6: Positive impacts 
Economic Social 
Landings from DWF used by local 
processing industry 
Development of by-catch industry by 
artisanal fishing sector 
Development of local processing with 
joint venture partners 
Contribution to export earnings 
Local canning industry 
Employment in processing 
By-catch offers source of protein for local 
community 
Employment of fishing crew on joint 
venture vessels 
Training and employment support 
Research 
 
Source: Derived from MRAG 2000 
 
These impacts are very context-specific and vary considerably in magnitude and are 
difficult to isolate from other factors affecting the sector.  The role played by good 
fisheries management systems was highlighted in the case studies.  For example, the 
monitoring, control and surveillance of DWF by Namibia was commended whereas in 
countries such as Cape Verde, Mauritania and Mozambique systems were particularly 
poor to the extent that marine resources are likely to be over-exploited whether or not 
there were access agreements with DWF.  They conclude that the most important 
factors that affect the impact of subsidies on resources and livelihoods in developing 
country coastal and island states are: 
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· The commitment of LDC governments to the control and regulation of fishing 
activities including capacity and fishing effort; 
· The commitment of LDC governments to introduce adequate measures to 
maximise rent extraction from subsidies; 
· The adequacy of legislation and its implementation with reference to illicit 
fishing within LDCs; 
· The position of fisheries within national economic and social development 
priorities; 
· The implementation of adequate macro-economic policies to stimulate growth 
and investment in the fisheries sector. 
(Quoted directly from MRAG 2000: 34-5). 
 
The MRAG study also calls for greater policy coherence in the EU. 
A paper on the implications of DWF and other subsidies for Central and Western 
Pacific island states is generally more positive about their implications for fish stocks 
(Grynberg 20003).  Despite the heavy dependence of some island states such as 
Kiribati and Tuvalu on access agreement fees, in most cases in this region there are no 
negative implications for fish stocks as the fisheries are well-managed, largely as a 
result of the terms in the access treaty with the USA (Grynberg 2003).  The US 
fishing treaties are compared with the last generation of European Union fishing 
access agreements which have tended to ‘exacerbate unsustainable fisheries practices’ 
as access fees are based on reported catches (Grynberg 2003:507)6.  Grynberg (2003) 
recommends that access agreements are ‘de-coupled’ from development assistance, as 
in the Japanese model. 
 
4.5. International debates and action on subsidies 
 
The main international body with authority on fisheries is the FAO, with the 
UNCLOS and the FAO Code of Conduct on Responsible Fisheries as the main policy 
instruments.  The most recent agreement to try to deal explicitly with the global over-
fishing problem is the UN Convention on Highly Migratory Stocks and Straddling 
Fish Stocks of 2001.  Despite arguments from many camps that the FAO is the most 
appropriate body to deal with issues related to fisheries conservation and 
sustainability, there have been increasing demands for fisheries and particularly 
subsidies to be brought to the attention of the World Trade Organisation and to 
subject fisheries subsidies more explicitly to the rigours of WTO trade law.  Pressure 
has come from both environmental non-governmental organisations such as 
Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and a group of WTO 
member states known as the ‘Friends of Fish’.7 
 
                                                 
6 An alternative model with less incentive to under-report is to base fees on number of fishing trips, 
used in Japanese agreements. 
7 Grynberg (2003) examines the motives of some of the Friends of Fish, suggesting that Iceland and 
New Zealand are keen to create a level playing field and push for the exit of less efficient fishing 
nations and so are motivated by competitive advantage; the USA he argues is less interested in 
commercial interests but in demonstrating that it does have an international environmental agenda; 
Australia is also deemed to have a political rather than economic or technical agenda. Grynberg 
disputes whether the developing countries involved in this grouping will be able to stomach any 
changes to the subsidies regime if they were required to change. 
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The first submission to the WTO on this topic was in June 1999 by five nations 
(Australia, Iceland, New Zealand, the Philippines and the United States) leading to 
discussion in the Committee on Trade and the Environment (CTE) in October 2000).  
This was followed by a second phase submission by eight members (the original five 
plus Chile, Ecuador and Peru) in April 2002.  It was argued that fisheries subsidies 
have trade effects greater than those in other sectors and beyond the distortion of 
competitive relations, because fisheries subsidies lead to a reduction in the potential of 
other nations to produce.  Due to the mandate of the WTO, these submissions focus 
on the trade effects of fisheries subsidies rather than the broader sustainability agenda.  
However, the attention of the WTO is being brought to fisheries subsidies due to the 
apparent failure of other mechanisms to deal with over-fishing and the apparent 
limitations of the SCM to deal with the specificities of the fisheries sector.  
Specifically the open access nature of many fishing grounds and the migration of fish 
between areas are highlighted and are argued to have implications beyond limitations 
on competitiveness. The Friends of Fish note three implications of this phenomenon 
(as described by Schrank 2003): 
1. Countries that do not subsidize and that restrain total catch to maintain the 
resource lose the extra catch to countries that subsidize and do not restrain 
total catch; 
2. Competition from subsidized distant water fleets can make it economically 
unviable for developing countries to develop their own fisheries and therefore 
to realize the benefits of their own 200-mile zones of fishery jurisdiction;  
3. Subsidies can contribute to stock depletion, with negative economic, trade and 
environmental effects for other countries that have an interest in the stock. 
 
Schrank claims that the first two arguments are not specific to fisheries and are 
therefore not deserving of special treatment under WTO and need measures that are 
more subtle than tools available under the SCM.  Moreover, he argues that 
countervailing measures are unlikely to be effective where the effects of subsidies are 
on domestic consumption rather than exports.  The third argument is about 
sustainability and should, he argues, be referred to UNCLOS. 
 
Indeed, member nations opposed to the WTO submissions on fisheries subsidies, the 
most vocal of which has been Japan,8 argue that the issue is better dealt with through 
improved fisheries management rather than simple elimination of subsidies and assert 
that action in this area is under the jurisdiction of the UNCLOS rather than WTO.  It 
should be noted that some of the most vocal opponents of the WTO submission are 
heavy subsidisers themselves.  Nevertheless an assessment of the potential outcomes 
from WTO action in this area suggests that they will have limited effects on the 
sustainability of fisheries and may actually have damaging effects on some  
developing country island economies, such as Kiribati and Tuvalu (Grynberg 2003: 
510).  The potential outcomes of debates on new disciplines on fisheries subsidies at 
the WTO considered by Grynberg (2003) include: 
· A variation of the traffic light system in the Agreement on Agriculture; 
· Amendments to the SCM; 
· The development of case law through the Dispute Settlement Mechanism. 
                                                 
8 Interestingly, the EU has been relatively quiet in these trade debates, but was more active in 
discussions at the Johannesburg summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 in relation to 
international agreements to limit fish catches to sustainable levels (Grynberg 2003). 
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The first of these would be the most comprehensive and potentially most effective 
mechanism provided that special and differential treatment is included for developing 
countries and environmental clauses were added to the agreement.  Grynberg (2003) 
regards the first of these provisos unlikely and the second unprecedented.  The most 
likely outcome, if negotiations were to go ahead, he  argues, is an amendment to the 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures agreement.  However, there remains 
considerably opposition to moves to change the ‘architecture’ of the WTO and so if 
there are really pressures to change rules, it may well be through the Disputes 
Settlement Mechanism, which has the least predictable outcomes and is least likely to 
take into account the policy reasons for subsidies and differentiate between ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ subsidies.  Grynberg (2003) agrees with Schrank (2003) that the proper 
forum for discussion of fisheries subsidies, and one more likely to lead to 
sustainability in fish stocks, is the FAO. 
 
4.6. Conclusions  
 
Fisheries subsidies are firmly on the international agenda.  It has been argued that 
fisheries access agreement s are the kinds of subsidy that have most impact on 
developing countries.  These subsidies have both positive and negative impacts which 
are very site and context specific.  Whilst there appears to be a general consensus that 
subsidies inevitably lead to over-exploitation of fish stocks and by implication 
negative social and economic impacts, this is not necessarily the case.  A more 
important factor appears to be the existence of an effective fisheries management 
system, which in some cases is paid for by subsidies.  It is clear that the removal of 
subsidies alone will not solve the problem of over-exploited fisheries. 
 
Should the WTO begin to define new disciplines with regard to subsidies in the 
fisheries sector, it will be important to ensure that there are clauses related to the 
Special and Differential Treatment of developing countries.  The recognition of the 
developmental needs of developing countries in this sector appears to be lacking in 
recent submissions to the WTO. 
 
Finally, this brief summary of literature on subsidies in the fisheries sector highlights 
the limited knowledge that exists on the implications of subsidies, their removal and 
liberalisation more generally on the livelihoods of people in developing country 
coastal and island states, particularly those dependent on fishing.  The two studies 
cited that specifically refer to developing countries (MRAG 2000 and Grynberg 2003) 
offer useful methodological insights and highlight the considerable differences 
between countries.  However, there still appears to be a need for more detailed 
information at the grass roots level. 
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Annex 4.1 
 
Value of production under bilateral agreements between EU member states and third 
countries (EU million) 
EU member 
state 
Average % Third 
country 
Average % 
Spain 399.64 82.48 Angola 24.42 5.04 
France 34.80 7.18 Cape Verde 0.94 0.19 
Greece 0.66 0.14 Comores 1.36 0.28 
Italy 6.72 1.39 Ivory Coast 9.21 1.9 
Netherlands 8.72 1.80 Gambia 0.12 0.02 
Portugal 33.72 6.96 Guinea 3.59 0.74 
United 
Kingdom 
0.25 0.05 Guinea-
Bissau 
32.34 6.67 
Total 484.51 100 Equatorial 
Guinea 
2.42 0.50 
   Madagascar 3.24 0.67 
   Morocco 259.07 53.67 
   Mauritius 0.45 0.09 
   Mauritania 97.46 20.12 
   Mozambique 0.26 0.05 
   Sao Tome 0.92 0.19 
   Senegal 24.20 5.0 
   Seychelles 24.52 5.06 
   Total 484.51 100 
Source: MRAG 2000 
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APC African Caribbean and Pacific 
APEC Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation 
DFID Department for International Development, UK 
DWF Deep water fleet 
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations 
FEOGA  
FIFG Financial Instrument of Fisheries Guidance (EU)  
GFT Government Financial Transfer 
MRAG  Marine Resources Assessment Group 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 
SCM Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement 
WWF World Wide Fund for Nature 
WTO World Trade Organisation 
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
 
